[apparmor] [PATCH v2 4/4] apparmor: force auditing of conflicting attachment execs from confined

[John Johansen]

On 6/13/25 09:32, Ryan Lee wrote:
> Conflicting attachment paths are an error state that result in the
> binary in question executing under an unexpected ix/ux fallback. As such,
> it should be audited to record the occurrence of conflicting attachments.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee at canonical.com>

Ryan,
your original patch made it into apparmor-next for the 6.16 that never
happened.

Ideally we wouldn't rebase for this. Can you apply this to apparmor-next
and send it as a

Fixes: 16916b17b4f8 ("apparmor: force auditing of conflicting attachment execs from confined")
patch


> ---
> 
> This is a v2 of https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/apparmor/2025-May/013613.html.
> 
> v1 -> v2: remove redundant perms.allow |= MAY_EXEC (which was also incorrectly outside of the intended conditional)
>   security/apparmor/domain.c | 7 +++++++
>   1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> index e8cd9badfb54..b33ce6be9427 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> @@ -724,6 +724,14 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(const struct cred *subj_cred,
> @@ -727,6 +727,16 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(const struct cred *subj_cred,
>   		new = x_to_label(profile, bprm, name, perms.xindex, &target,
>   				 &info);
>   		if (new && new->proxy == profile->label.proxy && info) {
> +			/* Force audit on conflicting attachment fallback
> +			 * Because perms is never used again after this audit
> +			 * we don't need to care about clobbering it
> +			 *
> +			 * Because perms.allow MAY_EXEC bit is already set
> +			 * we don't have to set it again
> +			 */
> +			if (info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_IX
> +			   || info == CONFLICTING_ATTACH_STR_UX)
> +				perms.audit |= MAY_EXEC;
>   			/* hack ix fallback - improve how this is detected */
>   			goto audit;
>   		} else if (!new) {