[Bug 1506995] Re: Ubiquity facilitate attack on crypto LUKS

[Dimitri John Ledkov]

this doesn't facilitate any attacks, until proven otherwise.

please note that during installation, there is no valuable data on disk
anyway, or in other words, all data written can be pre-calculated as the
predictable copy of the squashfs is done.

please demonstrate how you can recover encryption key based on the just
installed, yet otherwise untouched, machine.

** Summary changed:

- Ubiquity facilitate attack on crypto LUKS
+ Ubiquity uses /dev/null when setting up encrypted swap

** Changed in: ubiquity (Ubuntu)
       Status: Triaged => Opinion

** Changed in: user-setup (Ubuntu)
       Status: Triaged => Opinion

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1506995

Title:
  Ubiquity uses /dev/null when setting up encrypted swap

Status in ubiquity package in Ubuntu:
  Opinion
Status in user-setup package in Ubuntu:
  Opinion

Bug description:
  In Ubiquity's script/user-setup-encrypted-swap, the crypt partition is
  zeroed. This leaves it more vulnerable to attacks. The attacker knows
  the partition is zeroed and can more easily find the encryption key.

  The included patch solves this issue, but this can also be done in a
  faster way by using openssl.

  Patched lines:

  dd if=/dev/urandom of=$device bs=16M seek=1 2>/dev/null || true

  Alternative approch:

  openssl enc -aes-256-ctr -pass pass:"$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=128
  count=1 2>/dev/null | base64)" -nosalt < /dev/zero | head -c $size |
  dd of=$target

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