[Bug 2056739] Re: apparmor="DENIED" operation="open" class="file" profile="virt-aa-helper" name="/etc/gnutls/config"

[Martin Pitt]

There is also a similar violation [1] in a specific machine instead of
virt-aa-helper:

   apparmor="DENIED" operation="open" class="file" profile="libvirt-
edef5ae7-03e3-48b1-ac28-a9d8a116492b" name="/etc/gnutls/config" pid=1576
comm="qemu-system-x86" requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=64055
ouid=0

Christian's proposed solution should take care of that as well, but I
wanted to mention it just for completeness.

[1] https://cockpit-logs.us-
east-1.linodeobjects.com/pull-6048-20240311-121547-77e2f887-ubuntu-
stable-cockpit-project-cockpit-machines/log.html#53

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2056739

Title:
  apparmor="DENIED" operation="open" class="file" profile="virt-aa-
  helper" name="/etc/gnutls/config"

Status in apparmor package in Ubuntu:
  New
Status in chrony package in Ubuntu:
  New
Status in gnutls28 package in Ubuntu:
  New
Status in libvirt package in Ubuntu:
  New
Status in apparmor source package in Noble:
  New
Status in chrony source package in Noble:
  New
Status in gnutls28 source package in Noble:
  New
Status in libvirt source package in Noble:
  New

Bug description:
  Christian summarizes this after the great reports by Martin:

  gnutls started to ship forceful disables in pkg/import/3.8.1-4ubuntu3
  and added more later.

  Due to that anything linked against gnutls while being apparmor
  isolated now hits similar denials, preventing the desired effect of
  the config change BTW.

  I think for safety we WANT to always allow this access, otherwise
  people will subtly not have crypto control about the more important
  (those isolated) software. Because after the denial I'd expect this to
  not really disable it in the program linked to gnutls (details might
  vary depending what they really use gnutls for).

  I do not nkow of a gnutls abstraction to use, but TBH I'm afraid now
  fixing a few but leaving this open in some others not spotted.

  I'd therefore suggest, but we need to discuss, to therefore change it
  in /etc/apparmor.d/abstractions/base.

  Therefore I'm adding gnutls (and Adrien) as well as apparmor to the
  bug tasks.

  
  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

  
  Merely booting current noble cloud image with "chrony" installed causes this:

  audit: type=1400 audit(1710152842.540:107): apparmor="DENIED"
  operation="open" class="file" profile="/usr/sbin/chronyd"
  name="/etc/gnutls/config" pid=878 comm="chronyd" requested_mask="r"
  denied_mask="r" fsuid=0 ouid=0

  
  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---

  
  Running any VM in libvirt causes a new AppArmor violation in current noble. This is a regression, this didn't happen in any previous release.

  Reproducer:

    virt-install --memory 50 --pxe --virt-type qemu --os-variant
  alpinelinux3.8 --disk none --wait 0 --name test1

  (This is the simplest way to create a test VM. But it's form or shape
  doesn't matter at all).

  Results in lots of

  audit: type=1400 audit(1710146677.570:108): apparmor="DENIED"
  operation="open" class="file" profile="virt-aa-helper"
  name="/etc/gnutls/config" pid=1480 comm="virt-aa-helper"
  requested_mask="r" denied_mask="r" fsuid=0 ouid=0

  libvirt-daemon 10.0.0-2ubuntu1
  apparmor 4.0.0~alpha4-0ubuntu1
  libgnutls30:amd64 3.8.3-1ubuntu1

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