[Bug 2141233] [NEW] 26.04: outdated signed GRUB (Secure Boot) cannot unlock LUKS2 /boot with Argon2 (argon2i/argon2id) KDF – needs update + signed artifacts parity
D
2141233 at bugs.launchpad.net
Sun Feb 8 13:54:05 UTC 2026
Public bug reported:
A common setup is to use a separate encrypted /boot partition that must
be unlocked by GRUB (cryptodisk) in order to load the kernel and
initramfs. On Secure Boot systems, the boot path uses Ubuntu’s signed
GRUB EFI binaries, so this capability must be present in the signed
artifacts shipped via grub2-signed, not only in the unsigned build.
With the current Ubuntu 26.04 GRUB packaging snapshot lineage, GRUB
cannot unlock LUKS2 keyslots using Argon2 KDF (argon2i / argon2id). In
the current snapshot, the LUKS2 decrypt path still hard-fails with
“Argon2 not supported”, which blocks Secure Boot users from booting
systems with an encrypted /boot that uses Argon2.
Argon2 (especially Argon2id) is considered a stronger, more modern
password-based key derivation approach than PBKDF2 for protecting
encrypted volumes against offline cracking, because it is memory-hard
rather than mostly CPU-bound. This matters for encrypted /boot, where a
stolen disk enables unlimited offline guessing, and being forced to
PBKDF2 due to bootloader limitations is a real security downgrade.
Steps to reproduce:
1.Enable Secure Boot in firmware/UEFI.
2. Create a separate LUKS2 partition for /boot with keyslot KDF = argon2id (or argon2i).
3. Install Ubuntu 26.04 (daily/devel) using the default Secure Boot path (signed GRUB).
4. Boot and enter the LUKS passphrase at the GRUB prompt.
Actual result:
Signed GRUB fails to unlock /boot when the keyslot uses Argon2 KDF (the decrypt path hard-fails with “Argon2 not supported”).
Expected result:
Signed GRUB successfully derives the key using Argon2 and unlocks the LUKS2 /boot partition, then continues boot.
Additional info / evidence:
1. Ubuntu 26.04 devel currently uses GRUB snapshot 2.14~git20250718.0e36779 lineage; the unsigned source package page is:
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/grub2-unsigned
(In grub-core/disk/luks2.c, luks2_decrypt_key() returns “Argon2 not supported” for Argon2 KDF type in this snapshot.)
2. Signed GRUB is delivered via the grub2-signed source package:
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/grub2-signed
3. There is an upstream grub-devel patch series adding Argon2 KDF support for LUKS2 (e.g. “disk/luks2: Add Argon2 support”).
Upstream thread: https://www.mail-archive.com/grub-devel@gnu.org/msg41723.html
4. Link to the related grub2-unsigned bug for the core implementation
update; this grub2-signed bug is to ensure Secure Boot parity:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/grub2-unsigned/+bug/2141232
Request:
Please update Ubuntu 26.04 signed GRUB (grub2-signed) to a version (upstream 2.14 release tarball or newer snapshot) that includes LUKS2 Argon2 KDF unlock support for cryptodisk, and ensure the signed EFI images shipped for Secure Boot include this functionality.
** Affects: grub2-signed (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2141233
Title:
26.04: outdated signed GRUB (Secure Boot) cannot unlock LUKS2 /boot
with Argon2 (argon2i/argon2id) KDF – needs update + signed artifacts
parity
Status in grub2-signed package in Ubuntu:
New
Bug description:
A common setup is to use a separate encrypted /boot partition that
must be unlocked by GRUB (cryptodisk) in order to load the kernel and
initramfs. On Secure Boot systems, the boot path uses Ubuntu’s signed
GRUB EFI binaries, so this capability must be present in the signed
artifacts shipped via grub2-signed, not only in the unsigned build.
With the current Ubuntu 26.04 GRUB packaging snapshot lineage, GRUB
cannot unlock LUKS2 keyslots using Argon2 KDF (argon2i / argon2id). In
the current snapshot, the LUKS2 decrypt path still hard-fails with
“Argon2 not supported”, which blocks Secure Boot users from booting
systems with an encrypted /boot that uses Argon2.
Argon2 (especially Argon2id) is considered a stronger, more modern
password-based key derivation approach than PBKDF2 for protecting
encrypted volumes against offline cracking, because it is memory-hard
rather than mostly CPU-bound. This matters for encrypted /boot, where
a stolen disk enables unlimited offline guessing, and being forced to
PBKDF2 due to bootloader limitations is a real security downgrade.
Steps to reproduce:
1.Enable Secure Boot in firmware/UEFI.
2. Create a separate LUKS2 partition for /boot with keyslot KDF = argon2id (or argon2i).
3. Install Ubuntu 26.04 (daily/devel) using the default Secure Boot path (signed GRUB).
4. Boot and enter the LUKS passphrase at the GRUB prompt.
Actual result:
Signed GRUB fails to unlock /boot when the keyslot uses Argon2 KDF (the decrypt path hard-fails with “Argon2 not supported”).
Expected result:
Signed GRUB successfully derives the key using Argon2 and unlocks the LUKS2 /boot partition, then continues boot.
Additional info / evidence:
1. Ubuntu 26.04 devel currently uses GRUB snapshot 2.14~git20250718.0e36779 lineage; the unsigned source package page is:
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/grub2-unsigned
(In grub-core/disk/luks2.c, luks2_decrypt_key() returns “Argon2 not supported” for Argon2 KDF type in this snapshot.)
2. Signed GRUB is delivered via the grub2-signed source package:
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/grub2-signed
3. There is an upstream grub-devel patch series adding Argon2 KDF support for LUKS2 (e.g. “disk/luks2: Add Argon2 support”).
Upstream thread: https://www.mail-archive.com/grub-devel@gnu.org/msg41723.html
4. Link to the related grub2-unsigned bug for the core implementation
update; this grub2-signed bug is to ensure Secure Boot parity:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/grub2-unsigned/+bug/2141232
Request:
Please update Ubuntu 26.04 signed GRUB (grub2-signed) to a version (upstream 2.14 release tarball or newer snapshot) that includes LUKS2 Argon2 KDF unlock support for cryptodisk, and ensure the signed EFI images shipped for Secure Boot include this functionality.
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