[Bug 647071] [NEW] 0-day Maverick Kernel Upload

Fri Sep 24 18:46:45 UTC 2010

Public bug reported:

The Ubuntu Kernel Team would like to propose the following fixes which
would warrant a 0-day Maverick kernel upload.  All of the fixes are
security related in nature:

http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/2010/CVE-2010-3080.html

    ALSA: seq/oss - Fix double-free at error path of snd_seq_oss_open()

    CVE-2010-3080

    The error handling in snd_seq_oss_open() has several bad codes that
    do dereferecing released pointers and double-free of kmalloc'ed
    data. The object dp is release in free_devinfo() that is called via
    private_free callback.  The rest shouldn't touch this object any
    more.

    The patch changes delete_port() to call kfree() in any case, and
    gets rid of unnecessary calls of destructors in snd_seq_oss_open().

    Reported-and-tested-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso at cmpxchg8b.com>
    Cc: <stable at kernel.org>
    Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai at suse.de>
    (cherry picked from commit 27f7ad53829f79e799a253285318bff79ece15bd)

=====

http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/2010/CVE-2010-2960.html

    KEYS: Fix bug in keyctl_session_to_parent() if parent has no session
          keyring

    CVE-2010-2960

    Fix a bug in keyctl_session_to_parent() whereby it tries to check
    the ownership of the parent process's session keyring whether or
    not the parent has a session keyring [CVE-2010-2960].

    This results in the following oops:

      BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a0
      IP: [<ffffffff811ae4dd>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0x251/0x443
      ...
      Call Trace:
       [<ffffffff811ae2f3>] ? keyctl_session_to_parent+0x67/0x443
       [<ffffffff8109d286>] ? __do_fault+0x24b/0x3d0
       [<ffffffff811af98c>] sys_keyctl+0xb4/0xb8
       [<ffffffff81001eab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

    if the parent process has no session keyring.

    If the system is using pam_keyinit then it mostly protected against
    this as all processes derived from a login will have inherited the
    session keyring created by pam_keyinit during the log in procedure.

    To test this, pam_keyinit calls need to be commented out in
    /etc/pam.d/.

    Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso at cmpxchg8b.com>
    Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
    Acked-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso at cmpxchg8b.com>
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 3d96406c7da1ed5811ea52a3b0905f4f0e295376)

=====

http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/2010/CVE-2010-2960.html

    KEYS: Fix RCU no-lock warning in keyctl_session_to_parent()

    CVE-2010-2960

    There's an protected access to the parent process's credentials in
    the middle of keyctl_session_to_parent().  This results in the
    following RCU warning:

      ===================================================
      [ INFO: suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage. ]
      ---------------------------------------------------
      security/keys/keyctl.c:1291 invoked rcu_dereference_check() without protection!

      other info that might help us debug this:

      rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
      1 lock held by keyctl-session-/2137:
       #0:  (tasklist_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff811ae2ec>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0x60/0x236

      stack backtrace:
      Pid: 2137, comm: keyctl-session- Not tainted 2.6.36-rc2-cachefs+ #1
      Call Trace:
       [<ffffffff8105606a>] lockdep_rcu_dereference+0xaa/0xb3
       [<ffffffff811ae379>] keyctl_session_to_parent+0xed/0x236
       [<ffffffff811af77e>] sys_keyctl+0xb4/0xb6
       [<ffffffff81001eab>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

    The code should take the RCU read lock to make sure the parents
    credentials don't go away, even though it's holding a spinlock
    and has IRQ disabled.

    Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells at redhat.com>
    Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds at linux-foundation.org>
    (cherry picked from commit 9d1ac65a9698513d00e5608d93fca0c53f536c14)

=====

http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/2010/CVE-2010-2955.html

    wireless extensions: fix kernel heap content leak

    CVE-2010-2955

    Wireless extensions have an unfortunate, undocumented
    requirement which requires drivers to always fill
    iwp->length when returning a successful status. When
    a driver doesn't do this, it leads to a kernel heap
    content leak when userspace offers a larger buffer
    than would have been necessary.

    Arguably, this is a driver bug, as it should, if it
    returns 0, fill iwp->length, even if it separately
    indicated that the buffer contents was not valid.

    However, we can also at least avoid the memory content
    leak if the driver doesn't do this by setting the iwp
    length to max_tokens, which then reflects how big the
    buffer is that the driver may fill, regardless of how
    big the userspace buffer is.

    To illustrate the point, this patch also fixes a
    corresponding cfg80211 bug (since this requirement
    isn't documented nor was ever pointed out by anyone
    during code review, I don't trust all drivers nor
    all cfg80211 handlers to implement it correctly).

    Cc: stable at kernel.org [all the way back]
    Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg at intel.com>
    Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville at tuxdriver.com>
    (cherry picked from commit 42da2f948d949efd0111309f5827bf0298bcc9a4)

=====

http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/2010/CVE-2010-2954.html

    irda: Correctly clean up self->ias_obj on irda_bind() failure.

    CVE-2010-2954

    If irda_open_tsap() fails, the irda_bind() code tries to destroy
    the ->ias_obj object by hand, but does so wrongly.

    In particular, it fails to a) release the hashbin attached to the
    object and b) reset the self->ias_obj pointer to NULL.

    Fix both problems by using irias_delete_object() and explicitly
    setting self->ias_obj to NULL, just as irda_release() does.

    Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso at cmpxchg8b.com>
    Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem at davemloft.net>
    (cherry picked from commit 628e300cccaa628d8fb92aa28cb7530a3d5f2257)

=====

AppArmor: Initialize sa.aad.error within audit_net()

    sa.aad.error is always 0 and therefore aa_net_perm() will always
    return 0 (rather than -EACCESS) no matter how "net_allowed_af"
    is specified.

** Affects: linux (Ubuntu)
     Importance: Undecided
         Status: New

** Affects: linux (Ubuntu Maverick)
     Importance: Undecided
         Status: New

-- 
0-day Maverick Kernel Upload
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/647071
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