[3.11.y.z extended stable] Patch "iscsi-target: Reject mutual authentication with reflected CHAP_C" has been added to staging queue

[Luis Henriques]

This is a note to let you know that I have just added a patch titled

    iscsi-target: Reject mutual authentication with reflected CHAP_C

to the linux-3.11.y-queue branch of the 3.11.y.z extended stable tree 
which can be found at:

 http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git?p=ubuntu/linux.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/linux-3.11.y-queue

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to this tree, please 
reply to this email.

For more information about the 3.11.y.z tree, see
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Kernel/Dev/ExtendedStable

Thanks.
-Luis

------

>From 00a88a4cd1e52af010aa65bca4e77e601a2fff92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Nicholas Bellinger <nab at linux-iscsi.org>
Date: Thu, 5 Jun 2014 18:08:57 -0700
Subject: iscsi-target: Reject mutual authentication with reflected CHAP_C

commit 1d2b60a5545942b1376cb48c1d55843d71e3a08f upstream.

This patch adds an explicit check in chap_server_compute_md5() to ensure
the CHAP_C value received from the initiator during mutual authentication
does not match the original CHAP_C provided by the target.

This is in line with RFC-3720, section 8.2.1:

   Originators MUST NOT reuse the CHAP challenge sent by the Responder
   for the other direction of a bidirectional authentication.
   Responders MUST check for this condition and close the iSCSI TCP
   connection if it occurs.

Reported-by: Tejas Vaykole <tejas.vaykole at calsoftinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab at linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques at canonical.com>
---
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
index 130a1e4f96a1..3c9a8dfd1c2e 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
@@ -316,6 +316,16 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
 		goto out;
 	}
 	/*
+	 * During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the
+	 * initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by
+	 * the target.
+	 */
+	if (!memcmp(challenge_binhex, chap->challenge, CHAP_CHALLENGE_LENGTH)) {
+		pr_err("initiator CHAP_C matches target CHAP_C, failing"
+		       " login attempt\n");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/*
 	 * Generate CHAP_N and CHAP_R for mutual authentication.
 	 */
 	tfm = crypto_alloc_hash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
--
1.9.1