[PATCH 3.16.y-ckt 129/144] IB/uverbs: Prevent integer overflow in ib_umem_get address arithmetic

[Luis Henriques]

3.16.7-ckt10 -stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shachar Raindel <raindel at mellanox.com>

commit 8494057ab5e40df590ef6ef7d66324d3ae33356b upstream.

Properly verify that the resulting page aligned end address is larger
than both the start address and the length of the memory area requested.

Both the start and length arguments for ib_umem_get are controlled by
the user. A misbehaving user can provide values which will cause an
integer overflow when calculating the page aligned end address.

This overflow can cause also miscalculation of the number of pages
mapped, and additional logic issues.

Addresses: CVE-2014-8159
Signed-off-by: Shachar Raindel <raindel at mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jack Morgenstein <jackm at mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz at mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland at purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques at canonical.com>
---
 drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c
index a3a2e9c1639b..0b2584dbeba0 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/umem.c
@@ -94,6 +94,14 @@ struct ib_umem *ib_umem_get(struct ib_ucontext *context, unsigned long addr,
 	if (dmasync)
 		dma_set_attr(DMA_ATTR_WRITE_BARRIER, &attrs);
 
+	/*
+	 * If the combination of the addr and size requested for this memory
+	 * region causes an integer overflow, return error.
+	 */
+	if ((PAGE_ALIGN(addr + size) <= size) ||
+	    (PAGE_ALIGN(addr + size) <= addr))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
 	if (!can_do_mlock())
 		return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);