[PATCH 2/2] netfilter: x_tables: check for size overflow

[Luis Henriques]

From: Florian Westphal <fw at strlen.de>

Ben Hawkes says:
 integer overflow in xt_alloc_table_info, which on 32-bit systems can
 lead to small structure allocation and a copy_from_user based heap
 corruption.

Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes at google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw at strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo at netfilter.org>
(cherry picked from commit d157bd761585605b7882935ffb86286919f62ea1)
CVE-2016-3135
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1555353
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques at canonical.com>
---
 net/netfilter/x_tables.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
index 2e94272f7f85..d2671f6b2d7f 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
@@ -898,6 +898,9 @@ struct xt_table_info *xt_alloc_table_info(unsigned int size)
 	struct xt_table_info *info = NULL;
 	size_t sz = sizeof(*info) + size;
 
+	if (sz < sizeof(*info))
+		return NULL;
+
 	/* Pedantry: prevent them from hitting BUG() in vmalloc.c --RR */
 	if ((SMP_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 2 > totalram_pages)
 		return NULL;