[3.13.y-ckt stable] Patch "[stable-only] pipe: Fix buffer offset after partially failed read" has been added to the 3.13.y-ckt tree
Kamal Mostafa
kamal at canonical.com
Wed Mar 30 14:50:34 UTC 2016
This is a note to let you know that I have just added a patch titled
[stable-only] pipe: Fix buffer offset after partially failed read
to the linux-3.13.y-queue branch of the 3.13.y-ckt extended stable tree
which can be found at:
http://kernel.ubuntu.com/git/ubuntu/linux.git/log/?h=linux-3.13.y-queue
This patch is scheduled to be released in version 3.13.11-ckt38.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to this tree, please
reply to this email.
For more information about the 3.13.y-ckt tree, see
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Kernel/Dev/ExtendedStable
Thanks.
-Kamal
---8<------------------------------------------------------------
>From b0e567ed6df68d2facf1b96f13d1f26792ff2813 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ben Hutchings <ben at decadent.org.uk>
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2016 02:34:52 +0000
Subject: [stable-only] pipe: Fix buffer offset after partially failed read
Quoting the RHEL advisory:
> It was found that the fix for CVE-2015-1805 incorrectly kept buffer
> offset and buffer length in sync on a failed atomic read, potentially
> resulting in a pipe buffer state corruption. A local, unprivileged user
> could use this flaw to crash the system or leak kernel memory to user
> space. (CVE-2016-0774, Moderate)
The same flawed fix was applied to stable branches from 2.6.32.y to
3.14.y inclusive, and I was able to reproduce the issue on 3.2.y.
We need to give pipe_iov_copy_to_user() a separate offset variable
and only update the buffer offset if it succeeds.
References: https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-0103.html
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben at decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <kamal at canonical.com>
---
fs/pipe.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index 47f79ac..c281867 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -407,6 +407,7 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov,
void *addr;
size_t chars = buf->len, remaining;
int error, atomic;
+ int offset;
if (chars > total_len)
chars = total_len;
@@ -420,9 +421,10 @@ pipe_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov,
atomic = !iov_fault_in_pages_write(iov, chars);
remaining = chars;
+ offset = buf->offset;
redo:
addr = ops->map(pipe, buf, atomic);
- error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr, &buf->offset,
+ error = pipe_iov_copy_to_user(iov, addr, &offset,
&remaining, atomic);
ops->unmap(pipe, buf, addr);
if (unlikely(error)) {
@@ -438,6 +440,7 @@ redo:
break;
}
ret += chars;
+ buf->offset += chars;
buf->len -= chars;
/* Was it a packet buffer? Clean up and exit */
--
2.7.4
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