[xenial 4.4.0-188.218][PATCH 1/2] f2fs: fix to avoid accessing xattr across the boundary
Benjamin M Romer
benjamin.romer at canonical.com
Mon Aug 10 14:57:23 UTC 2020
From: Randall Huang <huangrandall at google.com>
When we traverse xattr entries via __find_xattr(),
if the raw filesystem content is faked or any hardware failure occurs,
out-of-bound error can be detected by KASAN.
Fix the issue by introducing boundary check.
[ 38.402878] c7 1827 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[ 38.402891] c7 1827 Read of size 4 at addr ffffffc0b6fb35dc by task
[ 38.402935] c7 1827 Call trace:
[ 38.402952] c7 1827 [<ffffff900809003c>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x6bc
[ 38.402966] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008090030>] show_stack+0x20/0x2c
[ 38.402981] c7 1827 [<ffffff900871ab10>] dump_stack+0xfc/0x140
[ 38.402995] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325c40>] print_address_description+0x80/0x2d8
[ 38.403009] c7 1827 [<ffffff900832629c>] kasan_report_error+0x198/0x1fc
[ 38.403022] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008326104>] kasan_report_error+0x0/0x1fc
[ 38.403037] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008325000>] __asan_load4+0x1b0/0x1b8
[ 38.403051] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fcc44>] f2fs_getxattr+0x518/0x68c
[ 38.403066] c7 1827 [<ffffff90085fc508>] f2fs_xattr_generic_get+0xb0/0xd0
[ 38.403080] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395708>] __vfs_getxattr+0x1f4/0x1fc
[ 38.403096] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008621bd0>] inode_doinit_with_dentry+0x360/0x938
[ 38.403109] c7 1827 [<ffffff900862d6cc>] selinux_d_instantiate+0x2c/0x38
[ 38.403123] c7 1827 [<ffffff900861b018>] security_d_instantiate+0x68/0x98
[ 38.403136] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008377db8>] d_splice_alias+0x58/0x348
[ 38.403149] c7 1827 [<ffffff900858d16c>] f2fs_lookup+0x608/0x774
[ 38.403163] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eacc>] lookup_slow+0x1e0/0x2cc
[ 38.403177] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008367fe0>] walk_component+0x160/0x520
[ 38.403190] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008369ef4>] path_lookupat+0x110/0x2b4
[ 38.403203] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835dd38>] filename_lookup+0x1d8/0x3a8
[ 38.403216] c7 1827 [<ffffff900835eeb0>] user_path_at_empty+0x54/0x68
[ 38.403229] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008395f44>] SyS_getxattr+0xb4/0x18c
[ 38.403241] c7 1827 [<ffffff9008084200>] el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
Signed-off-by: Randall Huang <huangrandall at google.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: Fix wrong ending boundary]
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0 at huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk at kernel.org>
CVE-2019-9453
[back-ported from commit 2777e654371dd4207a3a7f4fb5fa39550053a080]
[ben_r: adjusted patch, add def for VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE ]
Signed-off-by: Benjamin M Romer <benjamin.romer at canonical.com>
---
fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
fs/f2fs/xattr.h | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
index 862368a32e53..80e98235720e 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c
@@ -248,12 +248,17 @@ static inline const struct xattr_handler *f2fs_xattr_handler(int index)
return handler;
}
-static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr, int index,
- size_t len, const char *name)
+static struct f2fs_xattr_entry *__find_xattr(void *base_addr,
+ void *last_base_addr, int index,
+ size_t len, const char *name)
{
struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
list_for_each_xattr(entry, base_addr) {
+ if ((void *)(entry) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr ||
+ (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry) > last_base_addr)
+ return NULL;
+
if (entry->e_name_index != index)
continue;
if (entry->e_name_len != len)
@@ -401,9 +406,10 @@ int f2fs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, const char *name,
void *buffer, size_t buffer_size, struct page *ipage)
{
struct f2fs_xattr_entry *entry;
- void *base_addr;
+ void *base_addr, *last_base_addr;
int error = 0;
size_t size, len;
+ nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
if (name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -416,7 +422,9 @@ int f2fs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, const char *name,
if (!base_addr)
return -ENOMEM;
- entry = __find_xattr(base_addr, index, len, name);
+ last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
+
+ entry = __find_xattr(base_addr, last_base_addr, index, len, name);
if (IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(entry)) {
error = -ENODATA;
goto cleanup;
@@ -483,7 +491,9 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
{
struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
struct f2fs_xattr_entry *here, *last;
- void *base_addr;
+ void *base_addr, *last_base_addr;
+ nid_t xnid = F2FS_I(inode)->i_xattr_nid;
+
int found, newsize;
size_t len;
__u32 new_hsize;
@@ -507,8 +517,14 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,
if (!base_addr)
goto exit;
+ last_base_addr = (void *)base_addr + XATTR_SIZE(xnid, inode);
+
/* find entry with wanted name. */
- here = __find_xattr(base_addr, index, len, name);
+ here = __find_xattr(base_addr, last_base_addr, index, len, name);
+ if (!here) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ goto exit;
+ }
found = IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(here) ? 0 : 1;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.h b/fs/f2fs/xattr.h
index 71a7100d5492..cb87825a403c 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.h
@@ -72,7 +72,9 @@ struct f2fs_xattr_entry {
for (entry = XATTR_FIRST_ENTRY(addr);\
!IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(entry);\
entry = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(entry))
-
+#define VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE (PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct node_footer))
+#define XATTR_SIZE(x,i) (((x) ? VALID_XATTR_BLOCK_SIZE : 0) + \
+ (inline_xattr_size(i)))
#define MIN_OFFSET(i) XATTR_ALIGN(inline_xattr_size(i) + PAGE_SIZE - \
sizeof(struct node_footer) - sizeof(__u32))
--
2.25.1
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