NACK: [Unstable][PATCH 0/3] linux: Staging modules should be unsigned (LP: #1642368)
Juerg Haefliger
juerg.haefliger at canonical.com
Mon May 9 07:16:39 UTC 2022
Will send a v2 without SAUCE patches.
...Juerg
> Modules under the drivers/staging hierarchy get little attention when it comes
> to vulnerabilities. It is possible that memory mapping tricks that expose
> kernel internals would go unnoticed. Therefore, do not sign staging modules so
> that they cannot be loaded in a secure boot environment.
>
> [juergh: The above is the original bug that introduced this feature in Xenial.
> We seem to have lost it in Impish probably because of breaking changes in
> Makefile.modinst. So bring it back and while at it:
> - Remove modules that are no longer in the staging area from the list.
> - Add a check that verifies that only listed staging modules are signed.]
>
> Juerg Haefliger (3):
> UBUNTU: SAUCE: Add selective signing of staging modules
> UBUNTU: SAUCE: Update signature inclusion list
> UBUNTU: [Packaging] Add module-signature-check
>
> debian/rules.d/4-checks.mk | 10 +++-
> debian/scripts/module-signature-check | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/staging/signature-inclusion | 7 ---
> scripts/Makefile.modinst | 9 +++-
> 4 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> create mode 100755 debian/scripts/module-signature-check
>
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