ACK: [SRU Bionic/Impish 1/1] ptrace: Check PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP permission on PTRACE_SEIZE
Cengiz Can
cengiz.can at canonical.com
Tue May 10 06:16:02 UTC 2022
On Mon, 2022-05-09 at 21:42 -0300, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo wrote:
> From: Jann Horn <jannh at google.com>
>
> BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1972740
>
> Setting PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP is supposed to be a highly
> privileged
> operation because it allows the tracee to completely bypass all
> seccomp
> filters on kernels with CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y. It is only
> supposed to
> be settable by a process with global CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and only if that
> process is not subject to any seccomp filters at all.
>
> However, while these permission checks were done on the
> PTRACE_SETOPTIONS
> path, they were missing on the PTRACE_SEIZE path, which also sets
> user-specified ptrace flags.
>
> Move the permissions checks out into a helper function and let both
> ptrace_attach() and ptrace_setoptions() call it.
>
> Cc: stable at kernel.org
> Fixes: 13c4a90119d2 ("seccomp: add ptrace options for
> suspend/resume")
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh at google.com>
> Link:
> https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220319010838.1386861-1-jannh@google.com
> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm at xmission.com>
> (cherry picked from commit ee1fee900537b5d9560e9f937402de5ddc8412f3)
> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo at canonical.com>
Acked-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can at canonical.com>
> ---
> kernel/ptrace.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
> index 2997ca600d18..0a0fd0e74a6b 100644
> --- a/kernel/ptrace.c
> +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
> @@ -371,6 +371,26 @@ bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task,
> unsigned int mode)
> return !err;
> }
>
> +static int check_ptrace_options(unsigned long data)
> +{
> + if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) {
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
> + !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
> +
> + if (seccomp_mode(¤t->seccomp) !=
> SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
> + current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)
> + return -EPERM;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
> unsigned long addr,
> unsigned long flags)
> @@ -382,8 +402,16 @@ static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct
> *task, long request,
> if (seize) {
> if (addr != 0)
> goto out;
> + /*
> + * This duplicates the check in
> check_ptrace_options() because
> + * ptrace_attach() and ptrace_setoptions() have
> historically
> + * used different error codes for unknown ptrace
> options.
> + */
> if (flags & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
> goto out;
> + retval = check_ptrace_options(flags);
> + if (retval)
> + return retval;
> flags = PT_PTRACED | PT_SEIZED | (flags <<
> PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT);
> } else {
> flags = PT_PTRACED;
> @@ -656,22 +684,11 @@ int ptrace_writedata(struct task_struct *tsk,
> char __user *src, unsigned long ds
> static int ptrace_setoptions(struct task_struct *child, unsigned
> long data)
> {
> unsigned flags;
> + int ret;
>
> - if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
> - if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) {
> - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
> - !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
> - return -EINVAL;
> -
> - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> - return -EPERM;
> -
> - if (seccomp_mode(¤t->seccomp) !=
> SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
> - current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)
> - return -EPERM;
> - }
> + ret = check_ptrace_options(data);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
>
> /* Avoid intermediate state when all opts are cleared */
> flags = child->ptrace;
> --
> 2.32.0
>
>
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 870 bytes
Desc: This is a digitally signed message part
URL: <https://lists.ubuntu.com/archives/kernel-team/attachments/20220510/d2f4c72a/attachment.sig>
More information about the kernel-team
mailing list