ACK: [SRU][J 0/1, F 0/3] CVE-2024-26830

[Manuel Diewald]

On Mon, Jul 08, 2024 at 10:21:20AM -0500, Bethany Jamison wrote:
> [Impact]
> 
> i40e: Do not allow untrusted VF to remove administratively set MAC
> 
> Currently when PF administratively sets VF's MAC address and the VF
> is put down (VF tries to delete all MACs) then the MAC is removed
> from MAC filters and primary VF MAC is zeroed.
> 
> Do not allow untrusted VF to remove primary MAC when it was set
> administratively by PF.
> 
> [Fix]
> 
> Noble:	not-affected
> Jammy:	Backport - I ignored #defines next to the fix area, shouldn't
> 	affect the fix changes
> Focal:	Backport - same as Jammy, Clean cherry-picks from prereqs
> Bionic:	needed
> Xenial:	needed
> Trusty: not going to be fixed by us
> 
> [Test Case]
> 
> Compile and boot tested
> 
> [Where problems could occur]
> 
> This fix affects those who use the Intel i40e driver, an issue with 
> this fix would be visible to the user via unexpected system behavior.
> 
> Ivan Vecera (1):
>   i40e: Do not allow untrusted VF to remove administratively set MAC
> 
>  .../ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c    | 38 ++++++++++++++++---
>  1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> 
> -- 
> 2.34.1
> 
> 
> -- 
> kernel-team mailing list
> kernel-team at lists.ubuntu.com
> https://lists.ubuntu.com/mailman/listinfo/kernel-team

Acked-by: Manuel Diewald <manuel.diewald at canonical.com>

-- 
 Manuel
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