[SRU][P][PATCH 2/8] x86/vmscape: Enumerate VMSCAPE bug
Massimiliano Pellizzer
massimiliano.pellizzer at canonical.com
Wed Sep 17 12:22:38 UTC 2025
From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta at linux.intel.com>
BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2124105
The VMSCAPE vulnerability may allow a guest to cause Branch Target
Injection (BTI) in userspace hypervisors.
Kernels (both host and guest) have existing defenses against direct BTI
attacks from guests. There are also inter-process BTI mitigations which
prevent processes from attacking each other. However, the threat in this
case is to a userspace hypervisor within the same process as the attacker.
Userspace hypervisors have access to their own sensitive data like disk
encryption keys and also typically have access to all guest data. This
means guest userspace may use the hypervisor as a confused deputy to attack
sensitive guest kernel data. There are no existing mitigations for these
attacks.
Introduce X86_BUG_VMSCAPE for this vulnerability and set it on affected
Intel and AMD CPUs.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta at linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen at linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp at alien8.de>
(backported from commit a508cec6e5215a3fbc7e73ae86a5c5602187934d)
[mpellizzer: context adjusted due to missing commit
722fa0dba74f x86/rfds: Exclude P-only parts from the RFDS affected list]
CVE-2025-40300
Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer at canonical.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++-----------
2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 57794ec873aa4..4b8fd79548c62 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -542,4 +542,5 @@
#define X86_BUG_ITS X86_BUG(1*32 + 5) /* "its" CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
#define X86_BUG_ITS_NATIVE_ONLY X86_BUG(1*32 + 6) /* "its_native_only" CPU is affected by ITS, VMX is not affected */
#define X86_BUG_TSA X86_BUG( 1*32+ 9) /* "tsa" CPU is affected by Transient Scheduler Attacks */
+#define X86_BUG_VMSCAPE X86_BUG( 1*32+10) /* "vmscape" CPU is affected by VMSCAPE attacks from guests */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index ead1d95b01441..45e081dfbf4fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1233,6 +1233,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
#define ITS_NATIVE_ONLY BIT(9)
/* CPU is affected by Transient Scheduler Attacks */
#define TSA BIT(10)
+/* CPU is affected by VMSCAPE */
+#define VMSCAPE BIT(11)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS),
@@ -1244,44 +1246,53 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_G, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X, 0x5, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L, 0xb, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, 0xc, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X, 0x5, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L, 0xb, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, 0xc, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RETBLEED | VMSCAPE),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, 0x0, MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, 0x0, MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | VMSCAPE),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LAKEFIELD, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS | ITS_NATIVE_ONLY),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_P, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_S, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GRACEMONT, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_P, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE_S, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_METEORLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ARROWLAKE_H, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ARROWLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ARROWLAKE_U, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LUNARLAKE_M, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_GRANITERAPIDS_X, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_EMERALDRAPIDS_X, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GRACEMONT, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS | VMSCAPE),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RFDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ATOM_CRESTMONT_X, X86_STEP_MAX, VMSCAPE),
VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
- VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
- VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
- VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO | TSA),
- VULNBL_AMD(0x1a, SRSO),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO | TSA | VMSCAPE),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x1a, SRSO | VMSCAPE),
{}
};
@@ -1501,6 +1512,14 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
+ /*
+ * Set the bug only on bare-metal. A nested hypervisor should already be
+ * deploying IBPB to isolate itself from nested guests.
+ */
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, VMSCAPE) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
--
2.48.1
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