we should set a grub password by default
Sven
sven.lug-dorsten at gmx.de
Thu May 17 10:58:22 UTC 2007
Am Donnerstag, den 17.05.2007, 11:03 +0100 schrieb Matthew Larsen:
> Hi all
>
> I think putting a password by default on the grub booter just adds
> another level of unnecessary complexity for users. Enabling it by
> default you force people to learn another password which they then
> have to type in every time you boot etc etc.
That bias is simply not true. I explained it, Aurélien explained it, but
iam not getting tired :-)
You will not have to type any password to just start the computer.
You only have to type in a grub password for administrative jobs, like
temporary modifing kernel options or start the recovery mode.
> I think a better option would be to allow the system admin to set a
> grub password during installation if need be.
Iam allready averted from the request of setting it by default. My
proposal is:
Making grub password an optional but easy to configure feature. The
setup of the grub password should assist people, inform them about the
additional step of bios-boot configuration, inform them about the
remaining risk of physical access.
br, Sven
>
> Regards,
>
> On 15/05/07, Sven <sven.lug-dorsten at gmx.de> wrote:
> hello ubuntu developers!
>
> Jerome redirected me from my bug report #114838 to your
> audience.
>
> In short terms: I propose that during grub setup/configuration
> the grub
> password in menu.lst is activated by default. Please let me
> explain why.
>
> With the actual Ubuntu default settings anyone can easily
> gather
> root-privileges by rebooting and pressing e to enter edit mode
> in grub
> and add a init=/bin/bash kernel option. He can go on and do
> everything
> then.
> To establish a secure system with today's Ubuntu versions one
> would have
> to:
> 1) decide what requirements on protecting direct hardware
> modifications
> must to be established
> 2) set up the harddisk as the only boot-device, and protect
> this BIOS
> setting with a password
> 3) set up a Grub password to prevent boot-option modifications
>
> #1 and #2 are totally out of the operating system's focus, but
> #3 is
> something I'd like to talk about.
>
> To prevent this unauthorized boot-modifications gaining
> root-access,
> grub contains a password command line in menu.lst including a
> --md5
> option. If we set this password and don't change anything
> different in
> menu.lst, the only thing that changes is: grub options can not
> be
> modified and Grub's command line can not be opened to do
> different
> things.
> The Grub password can be be user defined during installation
> or be a
> random generated password, choosing a empty password
> deactivates Grub's
> password option.
> Then, assuming someone cared for #1 and #2, Grub's menu.lst
> can only be
> modified from the booted computer by an authenticated user.
>
> I think this is a little change most Ubuntu users wont even
> notice
> because they just use the grub manager to boot from the menu
> list, which
> will continue to work flawlessly.
>
> I think this "bug" is critical, because its nearly as simple
> as pressing
> a key during boot to gain root access. Most people i tell this
> did not
> know its so easy to compromise their linux system, which they
> installed
> because they thought its more secure than the "other os". Well
> it could
> be.
>
> Additional my proposal, i've seen a bug report comlaining
> about the
> alternate installation's grub password setup. It exists but it
> doesnt
> use the md5 hash method of grub, but clear text. The password
> is stored
> in menu.lst which is in 644 mode and everyone can read it.
>
> kind regards, Sven
>
>
> --
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>
>
>
>
> --
> Matthew G Larsen
> > mat.larsen at gmail.com
> > +44(0)7739 785 249
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